Brazil–Africa Agricultural Cooperation Encounters: Drivers, Narratives and Imaginaries of Africa and Development by Cabral, Lídia et al.
1 Introduction
Brazilian development cooperation is
increasingly in the spotlight. Its portfolio is
relatively small compared to other ‘rising
powers’– 2010 estimates of Brazilian cooperation
vary between US$0.4 and 1.2 billion,1 which puts
it below Chinese cooperation estimated at
around US$1.4 billion in 2009 (Brautigam 2009:
168). Yet, Brazil is a source of world-leading
expertise across a range of areas of great
relevance to developing countries’ development
processes – most notably agricultural research,
health and social protection – and increasingly a
reference for many African countries, especially
those with historical and cultural affinities with
this South American giant. The Brazilian
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa)
and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) are
internationally renowned institutions for
research on tropical agriculture and health,
respectively. Bolsa Família is the world’s largest
conditional cash transfer programme and has
played a central role in moving millions of
Brazilians out of extreme poverty (Vaitsman and
Paes de Sousa 2007).
Foreign policy has been a major driver of
Brazilian cooperation and former President Lula
da Silva was the engine behind the dynamism
noticeable during recent years. His policy
expanded the focus of cooperation beyond its
traditional focus on Latin America and on
Lusophone African countries, in what has been
interpreted as a strategy of autonomy (vis-à-vis
US hegemony) through diversification of
diplomatic and economic relations (Vigevani and
Cepaluni 2007). Africa had a prominent position
in Lula’s ‘presidential diplomacy’, justified by
reference to a frequently articulated sense of
moral duty as well as to the continent’s
commercial potential and geopolitical
significance as a southern ally (Matos 2011).2
Geopolitical alliances are particularly relevant in
the realm of the UN, with the significant
increase of diplomatic missions to Africa under
Lula being viewed as a key part of a strategy to
gather support for Brazil’s bid for a permanent
UN Security Council seat (Malamud 2011).
The trend over the first couple of years of the
administration of President Dilma Rousseff, who
succeeded Lula in 2011, has been one of
apparent continuity and emphasis on fulfilment
of previous commitments. However, new
refinements are being added to the approach.
Reflecting the new president’s decision to
emphasise meeting Brazil’s domestic
development challenges ahead of assuming new
global responsibilities, this approach is
increasingly ‘focusing on the search for new
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markets for national investment and exports,
particularly for higher added value products, and
the mobilization of international capacities
aiming at strengthening innovation in Brazil’
(Costa Leite 2013: 7).
Within the federal government, budget cuts have
forced a pause in the previously breakneck pace
of expansion of the Brazilian Cooperation
Agency (ABC),3 and there has been a marked
reduction in the intensity of presidential forays
into what became known under the Lula
government as ‘solidarity diplomacy’. This has
resulted in a slowdown in the rate at which key
agencies like Embrapa receive new demands
triggered by presidential visits or other
diplomatic offensives (such as the effort to
secure the post of FAO Director-General for
Lula’s former advisor José Graziano da Silva).
This article is based on interviews in Brazil as
well as the discussions at an international
seminar in Brasília, gathering together leading
policymakers, academics and practitioners.4 After
this introduction, the article provides an
overview of Brazilian development cooperation
and its Africa and agricultural foci. The
agricultural cooperation framework is analysed
against the backdrop of Brazil’s domestic
agricultural governance dynamics. Emerging
features of the Brazil–Africa encounter are
discussed and its fluid and contested contours
are highlighted.
2 Brazilian development cooperation
Brazil states that its development cooperation is
guided by principles of joint diplomacy based on
solidarity, no interference in domestic issues of
partner countries, demand-driven action,
acknowledgement of local experience, no
imposition of conditions, and no association with
commercial interests (ABC 2011: 3). These
principles are claimed to distinguish Brazilian
cooperation from traditional forms of
cooperation, particularly by reflecting a
horizontal relationship between southern
countries. Brazil rejects being labelled as a
‘donor’, a term it associates with the perceived
vertical nature of North–South cooperation.
Instead, it prefers to portray its cooperation as a
mutually beneficial relationship between
partners. The claimed benefits are not only
economic or diplomatic, as Brazil’s technical and
scientific cooperation initiatives have long
deployed a discourse of ‘mutual learning’.5
As a provider of development knowledge, Brazil
claims the advantage of having expertise and
technologies that fit the needs of developing
countries, due to greater proximity (vis-à-vis
Northern donors) in terms of economic and
institutional development, culture and language
(in the case of some African countries) and agro-
climatic conditions, which are particularly
relevant for cooperation in tropical agriculture.
As the former director of ABC, Minister Marco
Farani, put it:
Because of similarities in social and economic
realities and challenges to be faced in many
areas, partner countries can absorb knowledge
resulting from exchanging experiences with
Brazil, which are more easily adapted and
applied to real cases if compared to
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Figure 1 Brazilian development cooperation by modality (including debt relief and export credits), 2005–09 
Source ABC (2011: 13).
Export credits 42%
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traditional solutions offered by traditional
partners… Affinities of historical, ethnical,
cultural, linguistic and economic nature – as
well as shared heritage and aspirations –
favour the expansion and realization of
south–south cooperation and contribute to its
success (ABC 2010a: 97).
Brazil also emphasises that it can offer its own
tested solutions to development problems, rather
than ideas of what may work (Cabral et al. 2013).
Delivering appropriate ‘solutions’ to key
development challenges that draw on Brazil’s
own experience is seen both as a moral
obligation in South–South relations and as a
factor underpinning the country’s political
legitimacy in Africa. In an interview given shortly
after Lula took office, Presidential advisor Marco
Aurélio Garcia, one of the most influential
foreign policy thinkers in Lula’s Workers’ Party
(PT), stressed that ‘Brazil’s political weight in
global politics can come from its ethical and
moral presence in Africa; through the sharing of
solutions.’6
Technical cooperation is the most visible modality
of the country’s cooperation portfolio and the one
most explicitly used as a tool of diplomatic affairs.
Technical cooperation consists of the transfer and
adaptation of expertise, skills and technology
mainly through training courses, workshops,
consultancies, exchange programmes, and,
occasionally, the donation of equipment. Brazilian
technical cooperation is notable for drawing
mostly on civil servants with direct experience of
implementing the programmes whose transfer is
being attempted, rather than consultants or other
specialists from outside government. This means
that the full cost (including the opportunity cost
of staff time lost to the ministries and other
agencies providing the specialists) is difficult to
account for. Brazil also provides scholarships for
foreigners to study in Brazil; it assists countries
facing emergencies (Haiti is the largest
beneficiary of Brazilian humanitarian assistance);
it makes contributions to international and
regional multilateral institutions working in
development, such as several UN agencies or the
Inter-American Development Bank; it grants debt
relief to highly indebted poor countries and it is
increasingly offering export credits on
concessional terms to countries in Latin America
and Africa (Cabral 2011).
A 2010 survey estimates that in 2009 Brazil’s
development cooperation programme totalled
US$362 million, approximately 0.02 per cent of
GNI (IPEA and ABC 2010). This calculation
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Figure 2 Brazilian technical cooperation, annual budget and new projects, 2003–09
Source IPEA and ABC (2010) and correspondence with ABC.
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excludes, however, modalities such as debt relief,
export credits and food aid. Additional ABC
estimates indicate that export credits are the
largest cooperation modality, representing 42 per
cent of the overall portfolio during 2005–09.
These typically consist of loans on concessional
terms provided to other countries to finance the
acquisition of Brazilian goods and services and
hence promote Brazilian exports (Cabral 2011).
If this and other modalities (debt relief and food
aid) are added in, the proportion of technical
cooperation is a mere 3 per cent (see Figure 1).
However, technical cooperation, a key instrument
of Brazilian diplomacy, has been expanding
rapidly over recent years (see Figure 2).
There has also been a notable rise of trilateral (or
triangular) cooperation arrangements, whereby
cooperation is provided by Brazil alongside
another donor (typically a traditional donor) to a
beneficiary country. Japan, Germany, the USA
and several UN agencies are amongst the main
partners (on the provider side) of Brazil in
trilateral cooperation. For Brazil, this allows its
cooperation activities in third countries to be
scaled up, complementing its technical
cooperation inputs with other financial resources.
Also legal and bureaucratic obstacles that face
Brazilian government agencies working overseas
can be overcome; for example, by allowing
procurement to be handled by the international
partner. At the same time, triangular cooperation
also offers a route for maintaining strategic links
with traditional donors at a time when Brazil is
making the transition from aid recipient to
provider (Cabral and Weinstock 2010).
2.1 The institutional setting and coordination
challenges
There are a great number of institutions –
governmental and non-governmental – directly
involved in the implementation of technical
cooperation projects, raising considerable
coordination challenges. ABC is mandated with a
coordination role, and its capacity has been
greatly boosted over recent years – its budget
increased threefold between 2008 and 2010.7
However, ABC occupies a relatively low-grade
position in the government hierarchy. As a
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MRE), it is a ‘virtual’ agency, with no financial
autonomy or significant political clout. It has
therefore limited space to set the cooperation
agenda, plan ahead or act strategically in
deploying its financial and human resources. The
direction of cooperation is largely determined by
MRE and specialised institutions, such as
Embrapa for cooperation in agriculture, often in
response to promises made to African countries
during periods of ‘presidential diplomacy’ (see
Section 3). ABC’s coordination role takes shape
at the implementation level, organising the
protocol and logistics for missions of Brazilian
experts to the field.
Another factor constraining ABC’s coordination
function is the obsolete legal framework for
Brazilian cooperation which limits the ability to
operate abroad. Embrapa and Fiocruz are
probably the only Brazilian cooperation actors,
with the exception of the foreign office, which
have the legitimacy to establish a presence
overseas, although in the case of Embrapa, the
creation of an international branch – Embrapa
International – recently attracted significant
internal criticism, which contributed to the
resignation of the head of the agency in October
2012.8 Yet, ad hoc solutions have been developed
by ABC to circumvent these bottlenecks. For
example, it has relied on UN agencies, such as
the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), to deploy resources abroad and it has
recently appointed a Maputo-based
representative with specific responsibility for
coordinating Brazilian agricultural cooperation
in Mozambique, although there is insufficient
institutional support for the new role (Chichava
et al. 2013).
Finally, ABC’s mandate is restricted to technical
cooperation, which represents only a fraction of
Brazil’s development cooperation activities
abroad. Responsibilities for other modalities of
cooperation, such as debt relief, concessional
lending and emergency relief, spread across
several institutions including the MRE, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Development,
Industry and Commerce, the Chamber of
Commerce (CAMEX) and the External Credit
Assessment Committee (Cabral 2011).
3 Brazil in Africa
Africa featured prominently in Lula’s
‘presidential diplomacy’. The former president
often spoke passionately about Brazil’s affinities
with the continent and his country’s moral and
fraternal duty to support Africa’s renaissance.
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During Lula’s administration (2003–10),
presidential visits to the continent reached
record levels and the number of Brazilian
embassies across Africa more than doubled
(MRE 2011). Economic relations also intensified,
with a considerable rise in trade and private
investment in the mining, construction and oil
sectors (CINDES 2011).
During the first two years of her mandate,
President Dilma Rousseff paid her first visit to
the continent (touring Angola, Mozambique and
South Africa – a selection that reflects Brazil’s
list of primary investment destinations as much
as the country’s cooperation agenda) and created
Grupo África, an inter-ministerial group, with
private sector representatives, focusing on
Brazil’s relations with Africa. Dilma’s rhetoric
seems less emotional and more pragmatic than
Lula’s, with an explicit emphasis on commercial
and investment opportunities for Brazilian
enterprises, although also urging them to leave a
‘legacy’ to Africans through the transfer of
technology, training and social programmes.9
The role of MRE has been changing under Dilma’s
administration. The major emphasis placed by
Lula in the diversification of international
partnerships and enhancement of Brazil’s
projection as a global actor has given way to a
more selective orientation that privileges the
economic agenda, thus bringing diplomacy closer
to Brazilian companies operating abroad
(particularly those in the mining, construction,
agriculture and oil sectors, in the case of Africa).
A decline in the political rhetoric and foreign
policy activism towards Africa seems noticeable:
President Dilma’s trips to Africa have so far been
more restrained that her predecessor, and arguably
mainly motivated by an economic agenda.10
Reflecting the country’s diplomatic and
economic motivations, Brazilian cooperation
spread steadily across the continent, with
technical cooperation projects at either design or
implementation stage in at least 38 countries
(ABC 2011). In 2010, Africa accounted for the
largest regional increase in spending, having
absorbed 57 per cent of Brazil’s overall technical
cooperation budget, though this share is
expected to decline in the next two years.
The five Portuguese-speaking African countries11
still remain Brazil’s main technical cooperation
partners, with Mozambique being the single
largest beneficiary (see Figure 3). In 2010 these
accounted for 74 per cent of resources spent in
technical cooperation in Africa (Cabral and
Weinstock 2010). Yet, Brazil’s portfolio of partners
is being diversified, mirroring the spreading of the
diplomatic network and deepening of economic
relations across the continent.
Alongside technical cooperation, other
modalities are being increasingly drawn on for
South–South cooperation with Africa. Debt relief
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Figure 3 Top ten beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa, 2011
Source ABC (2011).
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has either been granted or is in the process of
being granted to several African countries,
clearing the way for additional lending to be
made available by the Brazilian banking system
(Cabral 2011). Some of these loans are
concessional and focused on development
objectives, such as a new credit facility to support
African farmers in buying agricultural machinery
for productivity gains and food security. Others
are primarily motivated by commercial
objectives, such as most lending provided by the
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to
countries like Angola, Nigeria and South Africa.
BNDES is a key ally and resource for major
Brazilian corporations such as Vale (mining) and
Odebrecht (construction and agri-business),
which are active in many African countries
(Barka 2011).
3.1 A focus on agriculture
Agriculture tops the list of Brazilian technical
cooperation sectors. Between 2003 and 2010, it
accounted for 26 per cent of the country’s
technical cooperation portfolio in Africa (see
Figure 4).
There are more than 20 Brazilian institutions
involved in technical cooperation in agriculture
in Africa, covering a wide range of issues, and
with very different conceptual and ideological
perspectives (Cabral and Shankland 2013). This
reflects the diverse stances of different Brazilian
institutions, ranging from those committed to
technical modernisation and agri-business and
those interested in ‘family farming’, agrarian
reform and agroecology. This plurality inevitably
brings with it contradictions and contensions at
the centre of the cooperation effort.
Embrapa, the research corporation, is by far the
most prominent institution involved. But as
Embrapa’s capacity to respond to burgeoning
demand from developing countries is being
stretched to the limit, it has looked for
partnerships with or given way to other
agricultural research institutions, including
universities like the Federal University of Viçosa,
as well as subnational agencies managed by
Brazilian state governments (ABC 2010b). As
the topics in the agriculture cooperation
portfolio with Africa diversify, so do the range of
Brazilian players involved. In particular, the
MDA’s presence in the portfolio is expanding,
carrying with it the focus on ‘family farming’,
food security and agrarian reform, sometimes
contrasting starkly with other efforts.
Despite the prominence of Lusophone countries
in the agriculture cooperation portfolio,
technical cooperation in agriculture has been
expanding considerably across the continent. An
event hosted by President Lula da Silva back in
2010 – Diálogo Brasil–África12 – played an
important part in promoting Brazil as a source of
cutting-edge expertise on tropical agriculture for
Africa (ABC 2010a). In his opening speech,
President Lula emphasised the crucial role
played by Embrapa’s research and development
in Brazilian agriculture, namely in transforming
the supposedly barren Cerrado, the central
Brazilian savannah belt, and noted opportunities
for transferring this experience into Africa as
‘the African savannah has the same productive
characteristics as the Brazilian Cerrado’.13 He also
singled out two particular agricultural
programmes, which the Ministry of Agrarian
Development (MDA) and other institutions have
Cabral et al. Brazil–Africa Agricultural Cooperation Encounters: Drivers, Narratives and Imaginaries of Africa and Development58
Figure 4 Brazilian technical cooperation by sector supported in Africa, 2003–10
Source ABC (2011).
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been implementing in Brazil: the More Food
programme and the Food Acquisition programme.
The More Food Africa programme aims to
increase agricultural productivity and food
security in Africa by improving access to
technology. This MDA-led programme adapts a
similar programme implemented in Brazil, since
2008, as part of the National Programme for
Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF). It
consists of a credit facility to support the
acquisition of farm machinery and equipment
supplied by Brazilian manufacturers, which have
been intensively involved with the design of the
programme, including in negotiations over
pricing. It is directed at ‘family farming’ (or the
rather different African equivalent), with
lending complemented by specialised technical
assistance. A total of US$640 million was
approved by CAMEX for implementation of this
programme in Africa in 2011–12. Credit lines
have already been negotiated with Ghana,
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal and Kenya.
Lula noted that ‘[Brazil] has the capacity to
create in Africa the same credit policies on offer
for Brazilian farmers’ and added that he would
like to extend the same credit line to countries
‘wanting to modernize their agriculture’.14
With regard to the Food Acquisition programme,
Lula emphasised that the programme has both
strengthened family farming and helped
developing regional markets (by ensuring 30 per
cent of food procured for school feeding
programmes are sourced locally), and announced
the intention to implement ten similar pilot
projects across Africa.15 A sum of US$2.4 million
has already been committed to take the
programme to five African countries: Ethiopia,
Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. The
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
the World Food Programme (WFP) are partners
of what has become a trilateral cooperation
programme.
3.2 Embrapa: the face of Brazilian cooperation in
agriculture
Embrapa is often seen as the face of Brazilian
cooperation in agriculture. It is a research
corporation that was established in 1973 to
promote technological development in
agriculture and particularly to support the
development of the Cerrado, the vast tropical
savannah of over 200 million hectares spreading
across the central regions of Brazil, whose
significant agricultural potential it helped to
unlock (Martha Junior and Ferreira Filho 2012;
Hosono and Hongo 2012).
Embrapa has grown into a massive organisation,
with a network of 47 specialised research and
service provision units distributed throughout
the country and specialised in products (maize
and sorghum, soybean, etc.), ecological zones
(Cerrado, semi-arid, etc.) and themes
(environment, satellite monitoring, etc.)
(Martha Junior and Ferreira Filho 2012). With
an impressive research capacity (8,200
employees including 2,600 researchers, 50 per
cent of whom have a PhD), Embrapa is today a
world reference in tropical agriculture research
and technology. Having played a key role in the
‘miracle of the cerrado’ (The Economist 2010b) it is
set to take this experience into Africa.
Embrapa dominates the portfolio of cooperation
projects as the source of expertise for
agriculture-related issues, particularly in areas
such as strengthening developing countries’
research capacity and adapting Brazilian
technology to these countries’ agro-ecological
conditions (ABC 2010b). It has its own
international cooperation division, responsible
for managing and coordinating technical
cooperation initiatives. This unit has about 50
staff distributed across three sub-divisions:
technical cooperation, ‘structural projects’ (see
Section 3.4) and scientific cooperation. The
latter is not concerned with cooperation for
international development, but rather scientific
exchanges (mostly with European and US
institutions) with the aim of strengthening
Brazil’s cutting-edge scientific research.
Embrapa draws on several of its specialised
research and service provision units for
development cooperation in particular topics.
Units whose presence seem most recurrent in
technical cooperation projects include: Embrapa
Horticultures, Embrapa Cerrados, Embrapa
Tropical Agroindustry, Embrapa Meat Livestock
and Embrapa Dairy Livestock.16 But the range is
increasing. In a single new project in one country
– ProSavana in Mozambique – there are as many
as 16 Embrapa units involved.17
Training courses for researchers and
practitioners from partner countries are also an
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important component of Embrapa’s contribution
to development cooperation. One-off courses are
giving way to a more structured and strategic
training programme coordinated by the recently
established Centre for Strategic Studies and
Training on Tropical Agriculture (CECAT). This
includes training not only on technical
agriculture subjects – from no-till planting to
post-harvest – but also on agricultural
economics, sociology, policy and institutions.
Embrapa’s footprint in Africa has expanded over
recent years, with a vigorous push from
President Lula, who was enthusiastic about the
research corporation’s potential contribution to
Africa’s development. In 2006, Embrapa opened
an office in Accra, Ghana, with the aim of
facilitating engagement with African institutions
on technical cooperation matters, although the
operation was downgraded in 2011 and now
focuses solely on Ghana projects. Embrapa’s
presence is now being strengthened elsewhere –
particularly in Mozambique, where a growing
portfolio of bilateral and trilateral cooperation
initiatives includes the most ambitious of
‘structural projects’, centred on collaboration
with Mozambique’s national agricultural
research institution (Chichava et al. 2013).
3.3 Brazil’s agricultural development policy:
contradiction or complementarity?
Since the late 1990s, Brazil has had two federal
government ministries with responsibility for
developing the country’s agriculture. The
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food
Supply (MAPA) describes itself as the ‘ministry
for agri-business’. It advocates domestically for
the interests of large-scale commercial farmers,
and externally for a favourable trade regime for
Brazilian agricultural commodity exports. It
oversees Embrapa and a number of other key
government agencies, including CONAB, the
agency responsible for managing the national
food reserves. MAPA has been instrumental in
the promotion of the concept of ‘agri-business’ as
a discursive frame for drawing together the
interests of groups pursuing different capital-
intensive forms of commercial agriculture, from
ranching to rice-growing, in defence of a
supportive policy framework for their activities
(Sawyer 2009). It is supported in this by a
powerful cross-party caucus within Congress, the
bancada ruralista. One of its leading members,
Senator Kátia Abreu, heads the Agriculture and
Livestock Confederation of Brazil (CNA), and has
herself been actively engaged in promoting the
expansion of Brazilian agri-business to Africa.
MDA describes itself as the ‘ministry for family
farming’. It oversees the land reform agency
(Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma
Agrária, INCRA), leads on the national
‘Citizenship Territories’ strategy for delivering
integrated rural and social development in
Brazil’s poorest regions, and runs a number of
programmes designed to ensure the provision of
technical support and credit for ‘family farmers’,
under the umbrella of PRONAF. PRONAF was
established back in the 1990s, before the creation
of MDA, as the main policy framework for
supporting family farming. The programme was
initially geared towards small farms with
intermediary or high levels of capital. But the
mobilisation of rural social movements around the
programme has gradually pushed it towards
supporting the smallest and most disadvantaged
farmers’ groups, including women farmers
(Favareto 2006). Today, the family farming policy
domain is structured around different
organisations representing distinct social
groupings within the broad family farm category.
Landless rural workers are represented by the
Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST), which
influences INCRA and agrarian reform policies.
Poor farmers are represented by workers’ unions
such as the National Federation of Workers in
Family Farming (FETRAF) and, especially, the
National Agricultural Workers’ Federation
(CONTAG), that in turn influence parts of MDA.
Finally, the wealthiest and relatively more
capitalised family farmers are closer to
organisations such as the CNA, through which
they channel their demands for cutting-edge
technology and access to high-value markets.
The penetration of the two different ministries
by distinct and often mutually antagonistic social
and political forces has, in simplified terms,
translated into a ‘two-headed’ polarised
structure and within Brazil entrenched political
divisions have prevented the emergence of a
policy framework directed at supporting the very
significant contingent of producers who bridge
the worlds of ‘agri-business’ and ‘family farming’.
The key questions arising are whether such a
polarised structure is reflected in development
cooperation projects and what implications this
may have for beneficiary countries.
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Other government institutions with a strong
presence are the Technical Assistance and Rural
Extension Enterprises (EMATER), providers of
agricultural extension services at the state level,
and the National Rural Learning Service
(SENAR), a parastatal linked to the CNA that
specialises in rural technical training. Some of
these institutions have their own international
cooperation units.
Besides governmental institutions, some NGOs
and social movement organisations are being
brought into the Brazilian cooperation
framework, and the General Secretariat of the
Presidency has played an active role in engaging
these actors in official cooperation
arrangements. A project aiming to recover and
preserve native seeds in Mozambique and South
Africa, Implantação de Bancos Comunitários de
Sementes Crioulas em Áreas de Agricultura
Familiar, draws on the experience of two
Brazilian social movement organisations in the
field, the Women Farmers’ Movement and the
Popular Peasant Movement, alongside the
Brazilian Institute for Economic and Social
Analysis (IBASE), a well-respected social policy
analysis and advocacy NGO. This initiative aims
to connect Brazilian rural civil society and
farmers’ organisations with their equivalents in
Africa, building on links already established
through networks such as Vía Campesina. The
engagement of the General Secretariat of the
Presidency reflects the extension into
international development cooperation of a
particular Brazilian dynamic of state
‘institutional hosting’ of social movements that
has intensified since the Workers’ Party (PT)
arrived in national office in 2002. This form of
support involves the creation of institutionalised
spaces for dialogue with even the most radical of
movements, such as the MST, linked to the
channelling of resources to movement leaders
and allies and the incorporation into government
policy of movement discourses and practices by
sympathisers positioned inside the state
(Cornwall et al. 2008).
3.4 Policy incoherence or demand-driven flexibility?
Despite all this activity and the multiple
institutions involved, there is no explicitly
formulated policy for Brazilian cooperation in
agriculture. Beyond the general guiding
principles, there is no official line on what the
policy objectives and approach are for
cooperation in agriculture – or indeed any other
sector or theme. The common justification for
this gap is the ‘demand-driven’ and ‘non-
interference’ attributes of cooperation, which are
claimed to require entering cooperation
agreements without pre-set agendas. The ‘no-
policy’ policy could be interpreted, however, as
the result of institutional segmentation of
cooperation in general and, for the agriculture
sector in particular, the fragmented nature of
Brazil’s agricultural governance.
The fragmentation of the institutional map
reflects to some extent the nature of Brazilian
technical cooperation. Despite over 20
institutions being actively involved in agriculture
cooperation, there is virtually no institutional
direction or coordination on the content of
interventions, as ABC’s role is essentially
confined to operational coordination, and MRE is
concerned with higher-level diplomatic issues.
What emerges is a cooperation framework that
lacks a unified or coherent policy direction and in
practice is shaped by the agendas, experiences
and indeed imaginaries of the various
institutions and individuals, from presidential
visions to the practices of those delivering
technical cooperation on the ground. The
unstructured institutional basis for engagement
allows for diversity to emerge, and change to
occur, often in an ad hoc fashion.
In recent years, changes in the nature of
Brazilian cooperation have indeed been taking
place, reflecting the increasing size of operations
as well as accumulation of expertise. On the one
hand, one-off small-scale technical cooperation
projects are progressively giving way to larger
projects, with a longer time horizon, focused on
strengthening capacities of local institutions and
with more explicit concern for impact and
sustainability. Such projects are referred to as
‘structural projects’ (ABC 2011). Cotton 4 was
the first of this kind.
The nature of technical cooperation is also
expanding beyond simpler forms of assistance
(such as training, study visits and workshops) by
gradually focusing on the adaptation of successful
Brazilian policies to the African context. This was
already happening in other sectors, an example
being Bolsa Família. In agriculture, the 2010
Diálogo Brasil–África event marked the
beginning of this shift and introduced the
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adaptation of Brazilian agricultural policies into
the technical cooperation portfolio. Examples of
this include the More Food Africa and Food
Acquisition programmes.
Furthermore, new modalities of cooperation are
also being introduced alongside technical
cooperation, as illustrated by More Food Africa,
which combines conventional technical
assistance in agriculture with a credit facility
directed to African farmers. Such a modality
blending approach may be a reflection of the
mixed motivations behind Brazilian cooperation,
which appears to be increasingly showing signs of
mingling solidarity-driven and business-driven
agendas.
Finally, triangular cooperation is adding scale
and visibility to Brazilian technical cooperation
projects. ProSavana, currently the largest project
in the agriculture portfolio, is the product of a
trilateral cooperation agreement between Brazil,
Japan and Mozambique. The Food Acquisition
programme is another example of a trilateral
partnership, between Brazil, the FAO, the WFP
and five African countries. The USA is also a key
partner in trilateral agricultural cooperation,
particularly in Mozambique.
4 Emerging features of the Brazil–Africa
encounter
What then are the emerging features of the
Brazil–Africa encounter, as framed by these
development cooperation efforts? What are the
political drivers, what are the narratives and
social imaginaries being deployed, and what are
the impacts and consequences on the ground?
Five themes emerge.
4.1 The confluence of altruistic and self-interested
motivations
Development cooperation in Brazil is explicitly
an instrument of foreign policy (Costa Vaz and
Inoue 2007) and, therefore, the expression of
geopolitical strategies that are bound to include
a range of self-interested objectives (Lima and
Hirst 2006). This is hardly different to any other
country with an international development
programme, although the degree to which
countries are forthright about the link between
charity and self-interest is somewhat variable.
Brazil claims, however, that its cooperation
approach is guided by the principle of ‘solidarity
diplomacy’, which brings together elements of
altruism (supporting those in need) and
reciprocity (forging mutually beneficial
partnerships) in a horizontal relationship
between southern peers. The combination of
altruistic and self-interested drives in Brazilian
cooperation mirrors competing perspectives
within Brazil with regard to international
relations and the balance between those
perspectives is likely to be changing as Lula’s
emphatic ‘solidarity diplomacy’ is giving way to
Rousseff ’s more business-oriented approach.
The narrative of solidarity fits well with the roots
and mandate of the lead party of the ruling
coalition – the PT – whose foreign policy
intellectuals were instrumental in giving initial
impetus to Lula’s policy of reaching out to Africa.
It also fits with objectives concerning geopolitics
and the quest for support, particularly from non-
OECD countries, for greater clout in global
politics and the governance of international
bodies in particular. The pragmatic impulse
responds to the drive of a growing economy like
Brazil to secure access to raw materials, markets
and profitable deals for its burgeoning businesses.
Africa, with its generous resource endowments
and relative political openness to engagement by
a rising power with no apparent colonial baggage,
represents an increasingly attractive destination
for Brazilian traders and investors.
Such multiple motives are evident in agricultural
cooperation where, on the one hand, there is an
agenda focused on assisting countries that are
seeking to achieve food sovereignty and to
strengthen their smallholder agriculture (often
promoted by PT-affiliated government officials
with links to Brazilian social movements and
their international networks, such as Vía
Campesina) and, on the other hand, commercial
interests which are shaping the nature of
assistance. More Food Africa is an example of
confluence of both motivations. The programme
aims to address productivity and food insecurity
constraints, including in newly resettled
agricultural land in Zimbabwe that has been
marginalised by traditional donors (Mukwereza
2013). But the programme is also serving the
interests of Brazilian industry, being seen as an
‘industrial policy’ designed to ensure a ‘steadily
increasing demand’ for the Brazilian farm
machinery sector (Patriota and Pierri 2013: 28).
ProSavana is another example of convergence of
interests in that alongside the technical
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cooperation component, focused on
strengthening research and extension, the
programme is also helping to steer private
investment from Brazil (and Japan) into
Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor via the recently
launched Nacala Fund (Chichava et al. 2013).
These contradictions bring tensions. Thus the
discourse of ideological solidarity that animates
the MDA’s More Food Africa programme may be
challenged by the reality of directing tied aid and
the need to ensure that loans are repaid. The
narrative of purely technical engagement that
Embrapa has sustained in ProSavana will
become harder to maintain once large numbers
of Brazilian investors start arriving in the Nacala
Corridor. The outcome of contestations over
which motivations should be given precedence
will inevitably reflect the relative power and
influence of the different groups – whether
diplomats, activists or investors – who have
aligned themselves with them. This, in turn, will
reflect wider political economy dynamics within
Brazil as this historically inward-looking country
adjusts to the broadening and deepening of its
global engagements.
4.2 Narratives of agricultural development: dichotomy
or pluralism?
Brazil’s cooperation policy for the sector is what
emerges from the sum of the various initiatives,
programmes and projects being carried out by a
range of institutions and people, generally guided
by a broadly defined code of conduct. As
discussed, contrasting narratives on agriculture
development emerge, reflecting competing
visions of development. In particular, there is a
tension between a model of agricultural
development prioritising smallholder production
systems and a model driven essentially by capital-
intensive and large-scale commercial farming
interests. Thus, the cooperation programme
spearheaded by MDA is tightly associated with
the former model, whereas most (though by no
means all) of Embrapa’s cooperation activities
tend to be associated with the latter.
Such competing visions mirror Brazil’s complex
agrarian political economy. Whether they are a
sign of a ‘Gramscian struggle for hegemony’18 or
of a ‘pluralistic model’19 is a matter of
interpretation. The former perspective seems to
highlight the dichotomy and inconsistencies
between two conceptually and ideologically
opposing models of development, reflected in
agricultural policy at the national and
international levels. The latter emphasises a
pragmatic division of labour that has arguably
allowed for the development of complementary
policies supporting both family farming and agri-
business. It also emphasises the positive diversity
of Brazil’s agricultural landscape, where ‘small,
medium and large farmers work together in an
environment conducive to innovation’.20 In the
words of President Lula: ‘Here in Brazil the
government has to finance both agribusiness and
family agriculture and we are proud to do this
because we understand the importance both
sectors have in Brazilian economy.’21
4.3 Knowledge exchange: first-hand experience and
the limits of the technocratic approach
One distinctive attribute of Brazilian technical
cooperation is the direct deployment of expertise
without intermediaries. Brazilian institutions
(governmental or not) typically make use of their
own staff to transfer into partner countries the
knowledge and policies with which they have
been experimenting within Brazil. Brazilian
‘development workers’ have first-hand
experience with the issues on which development
cooperation projects focus. For example, in an
ongoing food security research project in
Mozambique, called ProAlimentos, researchers
from specialist Embrapa centres in Brazil are
working directly in the field with researchers
from the Mozambican Agrarian Research
Institute testing suitable horticulture varieties
for the Maputo greenbelt (Chichava et al. 2013).
Likewise, staff from the MDA are working
directly with their counterparts in several
African countries to adapt Brazil’s More Food
programme to local conditions. Consultants are
occasionally contracted, but most of the work is
typically carried out directly by Brazilian
technocrats. The advantages of such an approach
are obvious, and in fact it is an aspect that
recipients frequently praise about Brazilian
cooperation (Cabral et al. forthcoming). But
there are some caveats.
While Brazilian ‘development workers’ are
experts in their own trade, they are not typically
(though there are exceptions) well acquainted
with Africa and the challenges of development in
African contexts. They tend to operate as groups
of single-sector specialists, without the
opportunities for developing a broader
IDS Bulletin Volume 44  Number 4  July 2013 63
2 Cabral IDSB44.4.qxd  18/06/2013  14:49  Page 63
understanding of local realities that can come
from involving different disciplinary
perspectives. Embrapa researchers may have the
skills to become world-class authorities on
African plant genetics and soil structures, but
establishing successful and sustainable research
programmes will require not only good crop
science but also a good grasp of the functioning
of local institutions and the political dynamics of
development.
The idea that development can be achieved
through technical fixes has a long history,
punctuated by repeated failures in many fields,
not least that of African agriculture. Brazilian
imaginaries of agricultural development, shaped
by experiences such as the transformation of the
Cerrado, are dominated by an inflated optimism
about the power of technological modernisation
that sometimes borders on techno-utopianism
(Shankland et al. 2012).
4.4 Discourses of historical and cultural affinity
Historical and cultural affinities are often
claimed to provide a particularly favourable
underpinning for cooperation between Brazil and
African countries. The affinities discourse was
particularly strong in Lula’s administration. For
example, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Celso Amorim, noted that: ‘Brazil and Africa are
connected by inseparable historical, cultural and
demographic bonds’ (ABC 2010a: 93). Recently,
at a BNDES-sponsored event on investing in
Africa, former President Lula put the Brazil–
Africa relationship in the following terms: ‘We
are natural partners, we are old friends, we will
always be brothers… Gone is the time when the
Atlantic separated us. It brings us together into a
single border. We are neighbours that bathe in
the same waters.’22
But despite historical bonds and the
agroecological similarities, the much-claimed
affinities between Brazil and Africa are largely
rhetorical. On the one hand, differences between
Brazil and most African countries, whether
economic, political or sociological, are not trivial.
Brazil has almost a century of experience with
channelling the proceeds from agricultural
commodity export booms into industrial and
service-sector development and fostering the
growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie, an
experience denied to Africa by the continent’s
much later decolonisation. African countries
have also had fewer opportunities to innovate at
scale, given its fragmentation into smaller
polities than ‘continental’ Brazil.
Brazil’s longstanding ties with some countries
arise from a Portuguese colonial past in which
Brazil and Africa were at opposite ends of the
slave trade. Many intellectuals of the Brazilian
Left draw analogies between resistance to the
military dictatorship in Brazil from 1964–85 and
the roughly contemporaneous anti-colonial
struggles in Africa, and the MRE corps includes
a strong contingent of diplomats whose
worldview was forged during the golden age of
anti-colonial solidarity (Dávila 2011). Yet the
struggles in Brazil and Africa were very different
in nature, as were the political systems that
arose from Brazilian democratisation and
African decolonisation.
On the other hand, gaps in knowledge about the
other side of the partnership remain deep across
the Atlantic. On the African side, the myth of
Brazil’s successful agricultural transformation
seems strong and a particular model of
agricultural development fills the dominant
imaginary of prosperity, with insufficient
understanding of the social and environmental
costs associated with that model (FAC 2010).
African elites attracted by the opportunities for
profitable association with Brazilian agri-
business have few incentives to question this
myth. In general, the main experience of
Brazilian agricultural development that African
policymakers and practitioners have is the
version presented to them during courses and
study tours; the more critical perspectives
developed by the growing numbers of African
students at Brazilian universities have as yet
found few opportunities to engage with the
official narratives.23
On the Brazilian side, the scope for developing a
more nuanced understanding of African realities
is constrained by several factors. One is how
recent and limited the physical presence of
Brazilian cooperation is. Furthermore, there is a
limited pool of expertise on which to draw, given
that Brazilian academic research and teaching
on contemporary African politics and society is
still limited. There is also limited influence of
Brazilian Afro-descendants, the social group
with, arguably, the closest cultural kinship with
the continent (or at least parts of it), in formal
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Brazilian institutions. The potential role of Afro-
descendants as brokers in the Brazil–Africa
knowledge encounter remains poorly explored.
Meanwhile, the Brazilian public’s perceptions of
the continent continue to be shaped by
representations in the media and the education
system that mix idealised ‘Mama África’
narratives of Afro-Brazilian history with negative
stereotypical representations of contemporary
Africa (Oliva 2009).
4.5 The role of civil society: reproducing Brazil’s
state–society dynamics
In the Brazilian context, civil society and social
movements have played a major role in public
policymaking. Can the development cooperation
model, currently confined to government-to-
government relations, involve greater
participation of Brazilian civil society?
The General Secretariat of the Presidency has
been actively engaging Brazilian social
movements in government-led development
cooperation, including particular projects and
the creation of a civil society forum for the
Community of Lusophone Countries (CPLP) to
promote civil society dialogue.24 Furthermore,
Brazilian civil society is itself becoming more
informed, organised and vocal around the subject
of international development.25
Within Brazil, the most influential civil society
groups are those with historic links to social
movements, and they have generally managed to
maintain a critical distance in their policy
engagements even as the process of ‘institutional
hosting’ within structures such as the MDA
brings them politically closer to government and
as their dependence on state funding grows.
However, there is no guarantee that this critical
distance will be maintained in the international
arena, in the absence of the highly mobilised
Brazilian grassroots constituencies who play a
key role in resisting the cooptation of civil society
representatives by the state.
Some Brazilian NGOs and social movement
organisations are already engaging with African
civil society groups. This is happening through
exchanges sponsored by international NGOs and
networks such as Vía Campesina, which has been
particularly present in Mozambique supporting
local concerns over the dangers of ProSavana
reproducing in Mozambique the social and
environmental costs of Brazil’s Cerrado
transformation (Chichava et al. 2013). It is also
happening through the official cooperation
channels facilitated by the General Secretariat of
the Presidency. These engagements are
underpinned by a particular Brazilian
understanding of the role of civil society, which
combines a critical posture with a premise of
symbolic equality and an assumption that the
state is permeable to development policies and
practices originating in civil society. How
applicable such models are in the African
context remains an open question.
5 Conclusion
The Brazil–Africa encounter, as being played out
in agricultural development, is rapidly evolving,
being framed by each of these themes. Each
displays distinct tensions, reflecting different
political dynamics, being played out in the
domestic sphere in Brazil and within cooperation
activities in Africa. For all the emphasis placed on
the potential of ‘mutual benefit’ in the philosophy
of South–South cooperation, the reality beyond
the rhetoric is more complex. Brazil has recently
been taking a more self-interested approach.
While Lula da Silva insisted that cooperation with
Africa was driven by altruistic motivations and a
sense of responsibility towards the continent,
President Rousseff is revealing a more pragmatic
attitude – and since leaving the presidency Lula
himself has become increasingly associated with
efforts to encourage Brazilian private investment
in Africa.
With the emphasis of Brazilian agricultural
development cooperation in Africa currently
placed so strongly on productivity and
technological modernisation, with the direct
deployment of Brazilian expertise, alternative
framings from within Brazil’s own agrarian and
social policy debates have been left behind. Will
the coexistence of ‘family farming’ and ‘agri-
business’ models in Brazilian agricultural
cooperation help to address the long-running
debates on small-versus-large production systems
in Africa in a holistic way – or will it, instead,
help to replicate a particular dualistic agrarian
structure and thereby accentuate inequalities of
power and access in Africa? Brazilian actors
associated with alternative framings, and
particularly the focus on ‘family farming’ – from
the MST to the agroecology movement – are
beginning to mobilise, questioning dominant
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development cooperation models within Brazil,
reaching out to build alliances with civil society
groups in Africa.
Ultimately, however, the outcomes of Brazil’s
emergence as a major force in African
agriculture will be shaped not only by the
contestations among Brazilian actors over which
agricultural development model to privilege, but
above all by the ways in which African
governments, farmers, entrepreneurs and civil
society activists absorb and shape the application
of the models on offer. It is these encounters –
between knowledge framings, diverse technical
and political actors and political interests – that
will, in the end, determine the contours of the
Brazil–Africa engagement. As this article has
shown, this is currently evolving fast and is
intensely contested.
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Notes
1 Sources are IPEA and ABC (2010) for the
lower figure and The Economist (2010a) for the
higher figure.
2 Lula’s first visit to Africa, in 2003, was marked
by speeches emphasising Brazil’s commitment
to ‘pay its historic debt to the continent’ (see
http://veja.abril.com.br/121103/p_052.html).
In 2005, Lula marked a visit to Senegal by
making a formal apology for Brazil’s role in
the slave trade, while also emphasising
Brazil’s desire to strengthen its diplomatic
and economic engagement with Africa,
www.valor.com.br/arquivo/456691/lula-pede-
perdao-para-reforcar-opcao-pela-africa
(accessed 27 March 2013).
3 Interview with ABC official, March 2012.
4 A longer version of this article is published as
Cabral and Shankland (2013) and available
at: www.future-agricultures.org/research/
cbaa/7817-china-and-brazil-in-africa-new-
papers#.UUG_KdbwlAo. Details on the
international seminar can be found at
www.future-agricultures.org/events/south-
south-cooperation (accessed 27 March 2013).
5 See, for example, www.valor.com.br/arquivo/
388309/ministro-diz-que-acordos-com-africa-
serao-bons-tambem-para-o-brasil (accessed
27 March 2013).
6 Interview in Folha de São Paulo, 19 November
2003.
7 From 17 million Brazilian Reais
(US$10 million) in 2008, to 52 million
Brazilian Reais (US$30 million) in 2010
(Cabral and Weinstock 2010). 
8 See http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/
noticia/2012-10-01/presidente-da-embrapa-
anuncia-saida-do-cargo (accessed 27 March
2013).
9 ‘Dilma revê estratégia para a África’, Valor
Econômico, 8 November 2011 edition.
10 President Dilma has so far been to Africa twice
and visited five countries: South Africa and
Equatorial Guinea, to participate in high-level
events, and Angola, Nigeria and Mozambique
for advancing economic interests.
11 These are: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau,
Mozambique and S. Tomé and Príncipe.
12 The ‘Diálogo Brasil–África em Segurança
Alimentar, Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento
Rural’ (‘Brazil–Africa Dialogue on Food
Security, the Fight Against Hunger and Rural
Development’) was held on 10–12 May 2010 in
Brazil’s capital, Brasília.
13 President Lula’s opening speech at the ‘Diálogo
Brasil–África em Segurança Alimentar,
Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural’,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgN4qtLLqGk
(minutes 33–34), (accessed 27 March 2013).
14 Ibid. (minutes 41–42).
15 Ibid. (minutes 43–44).
16 Interview with Embrapa, 13 October 2011.
17 Interview with JICA office in Brasília,
10 October 2011.
18 Interview with Head of International
Development at MDA, October 2011.
19 Interview with Embrapa representative in
Mozambique, July 2012.
20 Ibid.
21 President Lula’s opening speech at the ‘Diálogo
Brasil–África em Segurança Alimentar,
Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural’,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgN4qtLLqGk
(minutes 39–40), (accessed 27 March 2013).
22 www.institutolula.org/em-seminario-no-rio-
lula-elogia-iniciativa-africana-de-fomento-do-
crescimento/#.UPZ64x1g9Ao (accessed
27 March 2013).
23 Renato Athias, personal communication,
13 July 2012.
24 The CPLP comprises the five Portuguese-
speaking African countries, Brazil, East Timor
and Portugal.
25 Articulação SUL is one example of this trend:
www.cebrap.org.br/v2/areas/view/35 (accessed
27 March 2013).
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